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COMMENTS
an estoppel against the government if there has been misconduct on the
part of its officers.
Entrapment by officers approaches impropriety only when the in-
nocent are affected. It may seem undignified for officers of law enforce-
ment agencies to resort to deceit and trickery in order to apprehend
criminals, but because of the surreptitious conduct of lawbreakers, en-
trapment may in many instances be the only practical means to bring
them to justice. The law abiding are in no danger because of such prac-
tices, as long as the defense of entrapment exists, for courts will not as a
matter of good policy sanction a conviction where a person, not justly
an object of suspicion, is through undue temptation or pressure by an
officer induced to become a criminal. 34 The law does not frown upon the
entrapment of a criminal, but upon the seduction of the innocent by its
officers to commit crime.3 5
SOME ASPECTS OF ARRAIGNMENT
Discussing arraignment Blackstone said, "To arraign is nothing else but
to call the prisoner to the bar of the court, to answer the matter charged
upon him in the indictment,"' and Lord Coke said, "The arraignment of
the prisoner is to take order that he appear and, for the certainty of the
person, to hold up his hand, and to plead a sufficient plea to the indictment
or other record." 2
Arraignment at common law involved a formal ceremony which con-
sisted of four parts.3 (1) The defendant was called to the bar by name
and ordered to hold up his hand. (2) The indictment was read to him
distinctly so that he might clearly understand the charge being brought
against him.4 (3) It was then demanded of the defendant whether he was
guilty or not guilty of the crime for which he stood indicted. (4) The
plea generally being "not guilty" he was asked in which manner he wished
to be tried, by ordeal or by jury.
The modern practice is, in all essential particulars, the calling of the
prisoner, his identification as the person charged, the question addressed
to him personally whether he is guilty or not guilty of the charge contained
4 See Weathers v. United States, 126 F. 2d 118 (C.A. 5th, 1942).
35 Kott v. United States, 163 F. 2d 983 (C.A. 5th, 1947).
14B1. Comm. 317 (2d ed., 1769).
2Co. Litt. 558*
3 Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure, c. X, S 3 (1952).
4 During the early days of the common law all courtroom proceedings were con-
ducted in Latin but the reading of the indictment to the accused was in the vernacular.
"There was no thought of giving him a copy [of the indictment] because usually he
would not have been able to read it." Ibid. at 734.
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in the indictment, which is either read to him or a copy thereof furnished
to him either at the time of arraignment or previously. 5
At early common law the prosecution was required to adhere strictly
to the procedural steps involved in the formal arraignment ceremony.
Any deviation or omission in the arraignment procedure, however
trivial, was considered a fatal error, which, in most cases, resulted in
complete exoneration of the defendant. Technical objections in regard
to the sufficiency or absence of the arraignment were seized upon by
those judges whose consciences balked at the thought of sentencing a
man to the gallows for the commission of one of the numerous offenses
punishable by death.6 Perhaps the most important factor which per-
suaded the courts to require strict compliance with the procedural steps
was the practically complete inability of the accused to defend himself
adequately against a criminal charge.
7
The reasons for the rigidity and sterness of the common law courts
in dealing with arraignment are now no longer as persuasive as they were
during the era of their inception. With the increase in substantive per-
sonal rights, the decrease in the number of indictable offenses, and the
decline of capital punishment, objections as to the sufficiency of the
arraignment came to be treated with less consideration than they were
formerly. In the United States "due process of law" gradually emerged.
Technicalities, fine distinctions and subtleties of the law lost their promi-
nence. The important question became "Have the procedural and sub-
stantive elements of 'due process' been complied with?" The concern
of the courts centered on the judicial process as a whole to determine if,
from the time of arraignment to the time of conviction and sentence, the
conduction of the proceedings had operated to deny the accused those
basic rights afforded him by the law. Thus under modern law it is possible
that a criminal conviction stand as valid although formal arraignment was
lacking in some respect or even non-existent.
5 Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 208, 146 So. 827, 828 (1933).
6 "The English criminal laws may truly be characterised as written in blood. When
Blackstone wrote his commentaries, there were one hundred and sixty different kinds
of felonies, for the commission of which the offenders expiated their crimes on the
gallows. Stealing the value of one shilling was a capital offense." McKinney v. The
People, 7 Ill. 540, 549 (1845).
7 "When the individual, accused of a capital crime, was arrested he was immurred
in a dungeon . . . cut off from free intercourse with his friends .... On his trial for
any of the numerous offenses denominated felony, he was not allowed the aid of
counsel in his defence. He was not even allowed witnesses to prove his innocence.
And when . . . the Courts permitted the witnesses to be heard on the part of the
accused, yet they were not sworn, and the consequence was that their evidence was
not considered by the jury as entitled to as much credence as the witnesses on the part
of the government." McKinney v. The People, 7 Ill. 540, 549 (1845). Consult Garland
v. State of Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 646 (1914).
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But, since the three-fold purpose of arraignment ". . . is to establish the
identity of the accused, inform him of the charge against him and give
him an opportunity to plead," it is in itself an element of "due process."9
Thus, in evaluating objections as to arraignment, the primary determina-
tion would seem to be concerned with whether or not the accused has
been deprived of a basic right.
As stated previously, the obtaining of the defendant's plea was one of
the several functions the arraignment performed. However the arraign-
ment and the plea have been said to be separate and distinct parts of the
entire proceeding. 10 The importance of the plea is at once apparent for
without the plea there is no issue put before the court and therefore none
to be tried. Much confusion is generated by the courts in their vague
interchanging of the terms "arraignment" and "plea." In Parkinson v.
People," it was said, "The arraignment and the plea of the defendant
should be the first step in the progress of the trial upon the indictment
for a felony. They are essential to the formation of an issue .... 11
Courts have held that arraignment is necessary for the conviction of a
felony.13 Thus, a felony conviction has been reversed where the record
did not show that the accused was arraigned.14 Some authorities, in em-
phasizing substance rather than form, have held that arraignment is not
necessarily essential to a conviction, where its omission is not prejudicial
to the defendant's interests.15 The change in the federal rule exemplifies
this transition which has diminished the procedural formalities of arraign-
ment. In Crain v. United States,16 the defendant was convicted of
fraud. The record of the trial did not show an arraignment or plea. The
8 State v. Trabbold, 91 A. 2d 537, 538 (Del., 1952).
9". . . due process of law requires that the accused plead, or be ordered to plead,
or, in a proper case, that a plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can
rightfully proceed; and the record of his conviction should show distinctly, and not
by inference merely, that every step involved in due process of law, and essential to a
valid trial, was taken in the trial court, . . ." Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 645
(1896).
10 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. 656 (1870).
11 135 Ill. 401, 25 N.E. 764 (1890).
12 Ibid., at 402, 764.
18Thomas v. State, 255 Ala. 632 (53 So. 2d 340) (1951); White v. People, 79 Colo.
261, 245 Pac. 349 (1926); Shannon v. State. 89 Fla. 64, 102 So. 829 (1925); Pritchard v.
State, 190 Ind. 49, 127 N.E. 545 (1920); Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783,94 S.E. 168
(1917).
14 Harris v. U.S., 4 Okla. Crim. Rep. 317, Ill Pac. 982 (1910); State v. Forner, 75
Kan. 423, 89 Pac. 674 (1907); Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401, 25 N.E. 764 (1890);
Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882).
15 State v. Mitchell, 237 Mo. 212, 140 S.W. 887 (1911); Hobbs v. State, 86 Ark. 360,
111 S.W. 264 (1908).
16 162 U.S. 625 (1896).
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accused, however, did not object to the lack of arraignment and pro-
ceeded with the trial. The government's argument was predicated upon
section 1025 of the Revised Statutes of the United States which provided
in effect that no indictment should be deemed insufficient nor should the
trial, judgment or other proceedings ". . . be affected by reason of any
defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to
the prejudice of the defendant."'17 The court, however, said:
We are of opinion that the Rule requiring the record of a trial for an
infamous crime to show affirmatively that it was demanded of the accused
to plead to the indictment, or that he did so plead, is not a matter of form
only, but of substance .. .and due process of law requires that the accused
plead, or be ordered to plead.' 8
Later, in Garland v. Washington,'9 which overuled the Crain case, the
Supreme Court held that the want of formal arraignment did not deprive
the accused of any substantial rights and where the trial was fair and
not conducted in any manner prejudicial to the accused there was no
denial of due process of law. After deciding that a waiver ought to be
conclusively implied where the parties proceeded as if the defendant had
been duly arraigned, as if a formal plea of not guilty had been interposed,
and where there was no objection made on account of its absence until
the record was before the court for review, the Supreme Court said:
... the technical enforcement of formal rights in criminal procedure sus-
tained in the Crain Case is no longer required in the prosecution of offenses
under present systems of law. .... 20
Most of the courts who have departed from the indispensability of
formal arraignment have done so in conjunction with statutes which in
general provide that the trial, judgment, or the proceeding should not be
affected by reason of any technical errors which have not affected the
substantial rights of the accused. By these statutes courts are given the
authority to determine whether or not a failure to take certain steps has
prejudiced the defendant and thus constitute reversible error.21 Hence,
to challenge a criminal conviction under present law on the grounds of
inadequacy or absence of arraignment, primary emphasis should be de-
voted to an examination of the statute on arraignment, if one exists, to
determine if the particular crime charged requires arraignment, then to
ascertain if the accused waived such right or could waive such right.
17 Ibid., at 637. 19 232 U.S. 642 (1913).
18 Ibid. at 645. 20 Ibid., at 646.
21 United States v. Malloy, 31 Fed. 19 (C.C. Mo., 1887); Hudson v. State, 117 Ga.
704, 45 S.E. 66 (1903); State v. Straub, 16 Wash. 113, 47 Pac. 227 (1896); Hayden v.
State, 55 Ark. 342, 18 S.W. 239 (1892); People v. McHale, 39 N.Y. 758, 15 N.Y. Supp.
496 (1891); Allyn v. State, 21 Neb. 593, 33 N.W. 212 (1887); State v. Greene, 66 Iowa
11, 23 N.W. 154 (1885); Territory v. Shipley, 4 Mont. 468, 2 Pac. 313 (1882).
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There is a conflict among the courts as to whether arraignment is neces-
sary in cases of misdemeanors. The modem tendency is toward relaxing
the ancient rules of criminal procedure in cases of misdemeanors and
lesser degrees of felonies.2 2 According to some jurisdictions however, an
arraignment is necessary even in cases of misdemeanors. 23
By the weight of authority it is held that the right of the accused to
be arraigned may be waived; however, the accused must realize the nature
of the charge against him and must be given a full and fair opportunity
to defend himself.2 4 A few decisions hold that arraignment cannot be
waived in capital cases.25 Other jurisdictions recognize a waiver of ar-
raignment but hold that the plea is indispensible.26
A waiver of arraignment may be either express or implied. An express
waiver must be made in open court .27 Generally, the voluntary entry of
a plea by the accused and the participation in the trial without objection
to the want of arraignment constitute an implied waiver.28 Other states
have held that the accused must announce himself as ready to proceed
with the trial and then participate in the trial without objection before
a waiver of arraignment is established.2 9 The filing of a demurrer or a
special plea, 30 or the entering into an agreement that the case be tried on
a certain date have been held to constitute a waiver of arraignment.3 1
22 Kelly v. State, 37 Ohio App. 524, 174 N.E. 596 (1930); Dutton v. State, 123 Md.
373, 91 At. 417 (1914); State v. Forner, 75 Kan. 423, 89 Pac. 674 (1907).
23 State v. Moss, 164 Mo. App. 379, 144 S.W. 1109 (1912); State v. Hamshaw, 61
Wash. 390, 112 Pac. 379 (1910); State v. Barr, 7 Pa. 340, 79 Ad. 730 (1909); Wash-
ington v. State, 93 Miss. 270, 46 So. 539 (1908).
24 Padgett v. State, 117 Fla. 644, 157 So. 186 (1934); State v. Robinett, 312 Mo. 635,
281 S.W. 29 (1926); State v. O'Kelley, 258 Mo. 345, 167 S.W. 980 (1914); People v.
Munson, 83 N.Y. Misc. 308, 144 N.Y. Supp. 1081 (1913); Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346,
124 N.W. 492 (1910); Bishoff v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 340, 96, S.W. 538 (1906);
State v. Masberry, 113 La. 651, 37 So. 545 (1904); State v. Brock, 61 S.C. 141, 39 S.E.
359 (1901); Jones v. Territory, 5 Okla. 536, 49 Pac. 934 (1897); State v. Strarb,
16 Wash. 111, 47 Pac. 227 (1896); Hayden v. State, 55 Ark. 342, 185 S.W. 239 (1892);
State v. Hayes, 67 Iowa 27, 24 N.W. 575 (1885).
25 Davis v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. 563, 158 S.W. 283 (1913); Hack v. State, 141 Wis.
340, 124 N.W. 492 (1910).
26 State v. Brennan, 83 N.J.L. 12, 84 Ad. 1066 (1912); Hendrickson v. Common-
wealth, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1191, 64 S.W. 954 (1901).
27 Bishoff v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 340, 96 S.W. 538 (1906).
28 Polomskey v. State, 221 Ind. 6, 46 N.E. 2d 201 (1943); State v. Rasberry, 113 La.
651, 37 So. 545 (1904); State v. Weeden, 133 Mo. 70, 34 S.W. 473 (1896); Ransom v.
State, 49 Ark. 176, 4 S.W. 658 (1887).
29 State v. Glave, 51 Kan. 330, 33 Pac. 8 (1893); Spicer v. People, 11 IM. App. 294
(1882).
30 Kincade v. State, 14 Ga. App. 544, 81 S.E. 910 (1914).
31 State v. Thompson, 95 Iowa 464, 64 N.W. 419 (1895).
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In Illinois, furnishing the defendant with a copy of the indictment has
replaced the common law custom of reading the indictment to him.32
However, this statutory requirement has been held to be merely directory
and failure to provide the accused with a copy of the indictment does
not constitute reversible error unless the defendant demands a copy.8 3
While arraignment and plea have been held indispensable to a conviction
in Illinois,8 4 the ancient formalities are no longer in use.85 In discussing the
essentials of an arraignment, in Illinois, to meet the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was held in People v. Terry88 that due
process of law did not require the adoption of any particular technical
form of procedure, so long as it appears on the record that the defendant
had ample notice of the charge and sufficient opportunity to defend
himself adequately.
Arraignment is not essential for misdemeanors in Illinois.3 However,
the absence of a plea from the record, even in misdemeanor cases, con-
stitutes reversible error since the plea formulates the issue in all criminal
proceedings.8"
Whether or not the plea may be waived has not been explicitly decided
in Illinois. In the early case of Hoskins v. People,80 where the defendant
formally waived the arraignment but did not plead to the indictment, the
court held that the waiver of arraignment would not be deemed as waiv-
ing the plea. A vigorous dissenting opinion contended that a waiver of
arraignment should constitute a waiver of the plea, and that mere
formal irregularities should not impede the enforcement of the criminal
code. In Spicer v. People,40 the defendant was not arraigned and did not
plead to the indictment. However, the defendant announced himself as
82111. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 38, § 729. "Every person charged with treason, murder
or other felonious crimes, shall be furnished, previous to his arraignment, with a copy
of the indictment, and a list of the jurors and witnesses. In all other cases he shall, at his
request or the request of his counsel, be furnished with a copy of the indictment and a
list of the jurors and witnesses."
88 People v. O'Hara, 384 Ill. 511, 51 N.E. 2d 700 (1943).
34 Hoskins v. People, 84 Ill. 87 (1876); Yundt v. People, 65 I11. 372 (1872); Johnson
v. People, 22 Ill. 314 (1859).
88 "The mention of the prisoner's presence in court and that he was called upon
to the indictment, shows sufficiently an arraignment under our practice." Fitzpatrick
v. People, 98 Ill. 259, 260 (1881).
86 366 Ill. 520, 9 N.E. 2d 322 (1937).
87 "In prosecutions for misdemeanors the practice is to allow the plea of not guilty
to be entered without arraignment. But without this plea being entered there is nothing
to be tried." People v. Ezell, 155 111. App. 298, 303 (1910).
38 People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 174, 79 N.E. 2d 200 (1948); Parkinson v. People, 135
Ill. 401, 25 N.E. 764 (1890); Hoskins v. People, 84 l. 87 (1876); Yundt v. People,
65 Il. 372 (1872); Johnson v. People, 22 Il. 314 (1859).
89 84 Ill. 87 (1876). 40 11 M. App. 294 (1882).
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ready for trial. It was held that such announcement in effect constituted
a plea. However, in Miller v. People,41 where the accused voluntarily
proceeded with the trial without being arraigned or entering a plea the
court held that the conviction was a nullity. In spite of the similarity to
the Spicer case, the court ignored the state's argument that the voluntary
proceeding with the trial was tantamount to a plea.
The law in regard to arraignment has changed gradually. The reasons
for the strictness of the common law in this area have disappeared. Sub-
stantive personal rights, once unknown, have been made available to those
accused of crimes. Certainly criminal proceedings should not be affected
by reason of technical errors in procedure which have not substantially
prejudiced those basic rights of the accused afforded by present-day law.
Such would be inconsistent with due administration of justice and fatal
to efficient enforcement of the criminal code.
LESSOR'S LIABILITY UNDER DRAM SHOP ACT
The Illinois Dram Shop Act is a statute which, under certain conditions,
imposes joint and several liability upon the tavern keeper and lessor of
land used for the sale of intoxicating liquor. The Act is not a new one,
having been enacted originally by the Illinois legislature in the nineteenth
century. This comment is concerned with the lessor's, or land owner's,
liability under the Act.
At common law, there was no remedy for injuries incident to in-
toxication resulting from the sale of liquor, either on the theory that
there was a direct wrong or on the ground that there was negligence in
the sale.' The Illinois legislature created a right of action by enacting
the Dram Shop Act, or Civil Damage Act, as it is sometimes known. This
Act gives a right of action for injuries resulting from the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquor against the owner of premises who knowingly permits the use
of his property for such sale, and subjects the premises so used to a lien
for the payment of a judgment recovered against the lessee-tavern
keeper.
2
4147 11. App. 472 (1893).
' Schroder v. Crawford, 94 IM. 357 (1880).
2111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 43, S 135. "Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,
employer, or other person, who shall be injured, in person or property, or means of
support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual
or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name,
severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving
alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person;
and any person owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of any building
or premises, and having knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or
who having leased the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the
sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication
of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person or persons selling
